Abstract
The adequate possession of social capital is a vital element in social mobility theory. Pierre Bourdieu (1984 and 2005) is credited for drawing a distinction between the various forms of capitals, which one commands and especially the differences underpinning social capital as against cultural capital. Some theorists choose to distinguish social capital as a structure of interconnected relationships while others place emphasis on the norms and values of groups, which constitute engagement, trust and community development. Blacks and Africans in the Diaspora are not frequently the subject of social capital theory studies. I argue that the inadequate amount of such studies display a certain preconceived notion pertaining to the social class position of blacks and Africans in the Diaspora especially in post – industrial countries. In this paper, a review is attempted of some of the studies, which have been undertaken with ethnic minorities as a focal point. I go further and discuss the social economical and political setting in which educated blacks in the Netherlands have to strive for upward social mobility in the midst of drastic changes in government integration policies and public attitudes to ethnic minorities. To conclude a number of empirical findings are used to illustrate how some educated blacks use their social capital in the service of upward social mobility.
Introduction
The integration of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands is a passionate issue. This has become more so in the last years. One of the most noticeable features of this phenomenon is the manner in which persons with an ethnic minority background are consistently portrayed as cultural representatives of backward cultures vis – a – vis the Dutch culture. Next to this observation are the produced volume and content of migrant and integration studies, which are conducted in the Netherlands and received bearing the government's official stamp of approval in relation to policy usages. In the majority of these studies, emphasis is systematically placed on the deficiencies claimed to be inherent on the ethnic minorities' cultural practices in conjunction with their inadequate integration in Dutch society. In this paper, the focus is on the manner in which Surinamese, Antillean and Aruban educated blacks in the Netherlands use social capital as a factor in their upward social mobility processes. This paper is entering more or less barren territory, in terms of the available literature on this topic in the Netherlands (Cain, 2007).
The presence of blacks in the Netherlands is not a new phenomenon. In the 18 th century, the then white elite in the colonized Surinam and the Dutch Antilles had a habit of sending their children back to the mother country to pursue an education. In the later years, blacks who were enslaved were also brought to the Netherlands as housekeepers or as concubines. In the 19 th century there was a constant flow of the descendants of these enslaved persons, especially those categorized as coloured persons, who had gained entrance to the middle classes, in these colonies, to the Netherlands . This flow to the mother country continued unabated until around 1975 when Surinam became independent. In the case of the Dutch Antilles, Aruba obtained political statehood in 1996, but remained under the juridical umbrella of the Netherlands . The other five Antillean islands (Curacao, St. Martin, Bonaire, Saba and St. Eustatius) still carry the status of colonies or autonomous entities within the Kingdom of the Netherlands . A historical relationship, which emanated in the 16 th century, still lives on to the present. In this sense, the majority of Surinamese, Antilleans and Arubans in the Netherlands viewed from a juridical angle are members of the Dutch Kingdom . They are equitable citizens of the Netherlands .
Even thought the colonial relationship afforded the Surinamese, Antilleans and Arubans the right to settle in the mother country the major flow of migrants occurred after the Second World War. It was the period when, due to economic hardships in the colonies, the need was there to pursue new opportunities. At the same time, there were also a dire need for more heads and hands within the Dutch reconstruction economy. Next to the traditional arrival of students, there was an influx of Surinamese, Antillean and Aruban workers to the mother country. However, in the case of the Surinamese the biggest peak in the migration flow came in the period around 1975 to 1980. In 1980, visa regulations were implemented to stop the flow of Surinamese to the Netherlands . The Antilleans and Arubans migration peak was in the middle of the eighties when the oil refinery on both islands, Shell in Curacao and the Lago Oil Company in Aruba, due to economic expediencies, fired their employees and closed their doors. In 2005, approximately 326.000 Surinamese and 131.000 Antilleans and Arubans were registered as residing in the Netherlands . The vast majority of the Surinamese carry the Dutch nationality.
According to a study conducted by the Social and Cultural Planning Bureau (SCP) (2007) the net amount of Surinamese workers population in the age group 16–65 years employed in the Netherlands has slightly risen in 2006 in comparison to 2005, while in the case of the Antilleans and Arubans this has remained more or less the same. On the issue of participation in the labour market, Surinamese, Antilleans and Arubans have an average of 18% unemployment rate in comparison to 5% under the native Dutch labour population. In 2006, 22% of the migrant youths compared to 9% of native Dutch youths were unemployed (SCP, 2007:141). In the specific case of the Antillean youths 33% were unemployed in 2006. This same study argues that ‘Dutch capital' amounts to migrants attaining educational qualifications in the Netherlands , which is an asset in term of one's labour market position. The majority of the educated blacks referred to in this paper obtained their education and training in the Netherlands . How many of these educated blacks are employed in the higher echelons of organisations, due to their educational achievement, talent, experience, social skills, their social networks and other factors is not known (Cain, 2007).
This paper looks at the role social capital plays in the life chances of Surinamese, Antillean and Aruban educated blacks as a factor in their upward social mobility processes. An obvious question is: In what sort of social networks do these Surinamese, Antilleans and Arubans educated blacks participate? An additional question could be whether they attained their present social position in the Netherlands by relying partly on their social networks or whether their social networks were more of an impediment to their upward social mobility. Bear in mind that the point of departure is this paper is not to use social capital theory as an explanatory tool regarding the upward social mobility processes. In the sense of determining, whether social capital theory is appropriate to analyse and describe these processes. The approach in this paper is to look at social capital theory in terms of social capital as a factor, which could be useful for upward social mobility purposes.
In the first section, I review briefly the manner in which social capital as a theoretical concept is discussed and employed using the available literature. Concurrently, I will try to trace the relation between the usage of social capital theory and how this relates to the life chances of ethnic minorities in general and specifically black people or better said Africans in the Diaspora. In the second section, the political setting in the Netherlands in which educated blacks are expected to excel is looked at within the context of changes in government integration policies and public attitudes to ethnic minorities since the beginning of the twenty first century. This is presented as a special case to further examine whether the effects of government policies influence the use of social capital by educated blacks. This is followed in the third section by a discussion of social capital as a structure of relationships and then ethnicity as social capital by making periodically use of the findings from an earlier study (Cain, 2007) pertaining to social mobility and ethnic minorities in the Netherlands to illustrate certain points. Finally, in concluding I will return to the central question pertaining to whether the social capital, which educated blacks command, could assist them in their drive and ambition toward upward social mobility in the Netherlands .
Is Social Capital an Asset?
Blacks or Africans in the Diaspora are not often the subject of social capital studies or discussions. A number of these studies in the United Kingdom (UK) and North America , which pay attention to blacks, do this frequently in the context of a broader ethnic minorities or ethnic diversity setting (cf Coleman, 1988; Portes, 1998; Dwyer et al., 2006; Putnam, 2007). A few recent exceptions are Reynolds (2008) who looked at the effects of social capital used by Caribbean second – generation return migrants. Then there is the work of Campbell (2004) on social capital in relation to African-Caribbean participation in the UK . A study of the employment strategies and other methods for upward mobility by educated Caribbean – born black men in Canada was performed by Plaza (1998). However, the study by Plaza was done in the context of social mobility theory and not particularly propelled by social capital theory.
In the thesis of Bourdieu (2005) capital is explained as: “The force attached to an agent that depends on its various ‘strengths', sometimes called strategic market assets, differential factors of success (or failures), which may provide it with a competitive advantage, that is to say, more precisely, on the volume and structure of the capital the agent possesses in its different species” (2005:194). Coleman (1988) positioned social capital in the realms of the creating of human capital. Bourdieu's definition of social capital amounts to an asset, which when available to agent (the famioy or the individual) could be used at agent's disposal. In his study: Social Capital; Origins and Application (Portes, 1998) quoted Bourdieu (1984) to define social capital as “ the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationship of mutual acquaintance or recognition ”. It must be said that influence by an agent in relation to this particular capital is just one of the ways in which a difference could be made in terms of his/her opportunities and class transformation. The agent does not necessarily have control over the effects and results emanating form his/her social networks. In other words, one could be part of a certain social network without attaining specific goals, which are inherent to social networking.
In terms of the manner in which social capital has been employed in social theory Portes (1998) provides one of the most comprehensive comparisons of the work of the three most well – know social capital theorists . Portes traces the birth of social capital back to Durkheim (1984), who analysed Marx's distinction between an atomised ‘class – in – itself' and a mobilized and effective ‘class – for – itself'. However, Portes credits Bourdieu for providing arguably the most theoretically refined analysis of social capital among those that introduced the term in contemporary sociological discourse. Portes went on to mention the work of Glenn Loury (1977) who wrote frequently about neoclassical theories of racial income inequality and their policy implications plus Loury's contribution to social capital theory, which paved the way for the work of Coleman.
Outside the concept of social capital amounting to a structure of relationships, Coleman (1988) views ethnicity as a form of social capital. If one was to follow Coleman and view ethnicity as a form of social capital; Will it be fair to say that ethnicity works as positive social capital for a certain socio – racial group and negative for other socio – racial groups in the same circumstances? Does it make sense that social laws or codes, which are unwritten and subtle, could be accordingly utilized by a dominant group to further its own interests, within a culture of inequality of opportunities? Dwyer et al. (2006) set out in a paper to look at the possibility of using social capital theory to analyse the ways in which ethnicity might have an influence on attaining educational success (and the lack of success) of some Pakistani young men and women in the UK. They claimed that to analyse ethnicity as social capital is not straightforward or clear – cut. Nevertheless, they held the possibility open to view ethnicity as both a positive and a negative form of social capital. According to Dwyer et al, Bourdieu's work suggests that families lacking economic capital could make use of other capitals to achieve their educational aims and goals. Dwyer et al then asked whether: “It is possible to see ethnicity, operating as a form of social network or as a set of shared norms and values, and as a form of social or cultural capital?” (2006:4).
The question posed above by Dwyer et al, pertaining to the definition of social capital, is attractive in the sense of coming to grips with social capital as an asset of the family or the agent or ethnicity as social capital. One might be tempted to say that the experienced and used social capital of ethnic minorities could amount to an interlocking concept meaning the same thing, which is social capital as a structure and social capital in itself. In the sense of the case when the social capital of ethnic minorities is tied up within a particular ethnic group. However, the downside of this social capital could be the exclusion of others who are not members of that particular ethnic group. Dwyer et al argue against a fixation on class formation and structures as in the work of Bourdieu to avoid missing the picture by equating social capital with the resources gained through it. The question is whether one could do an analysis of social stratification without paying attention to the class origin and class destination of agent. My argument is that when Zhou (2005) is quoted by Dwyer et al to illustrate that shared family norms and values combined with interlocking network of ethnic relations to constitute a form of ethnic social capital, the case is not totally made to accept ethnicity as social capital, which interlinks with the social class position of the parents (family) to produce upward social mobility outcomes.
The social class position of parents and or an agent is related to the social and cultural capital they possess. When social capital is compared to cultural capital in the social stratification discussion, Silva & Edwards (2004) take Bourdieu to task concerning his theoretical and methodological shortcomings in the usage of cultural capital. This is in relation to his lack of clarity regarding cultural capital and its relationship to ethnic and gender division and whether this capital is a household or an individual resource. This critique is rightly seen as related to the lack of sufficient knowledge pertaining to the effect of social and cultural capital on class, gender and especially ethnicity . Interestingly, the transfers of cultural capital is dealt with by Brown (2003:156) in a different way, where he argues that children from affluent or wealthy backgrounds can inherit the car, television, the house, etc., but they cannot directly inherit cultural capital. If cultural capital is as important as social capital in terms of the discontinuity of social inequality, how does this thesis relates to the social mobility processes of ethnic minorities? In concluding one could venture the suggestion to look at the influence of agent cultural capital on his/her social capital in the determining of whether his/her social capital does play a role in his/her social stratification.
In the following section, I continue by describing the framework in which the educated blacks in the Netherlands operate in terms of striving for upward social mobility.
The setting for Social Mobility in the Netherlands
In this so–called post–multicultural period in the Netherlands , one cannot possibly limit one's academic work regarding ethnic minorities to a description and an analysis of their lack of cultural integration or their social and economical problems. The popular and accepted mindset of painting a negative picture of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands is strongly related to the manner in which migration and integration policies in the Netherlands historically have evolved over the last fifty years and have been drastically transformed from around the beginning of the twenty first century. Scholars such as, Ghorashi (2006), Vasta (2006) and Wekker (2004) have referred to the period from 2002 to the present as a period of the ‘backlash'. Essed & Nimako (2006) in their study dealing with research and developments in the field of race, ethnicity and immigration also made specific references to this period in the Netherlands . Even the Scientific Council for Government Policies (WRR) (2007) , a government appointed body, is rather critical regarding government policies, which have been developing from integration to national identity and loyalty policies.
Some scholars locate the ‘The backlash' in the aftermath of ‘9-11, and the emergence of a political ‘mind set', which came with the winning of the general elections in 2002 by the List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) and the participation of the LPF in the then coalition government, the winning of the local elections in the city of Rotterdam by Leefbaar Rotterdam (LR), also a political party set–up by Pim Fortuyn. From 2003 his political thinking and philosophy continues to dominate Dutch politics and public opinion regarding migrants, especially Muslims and their integration in Dutch society. I choose to trace ‘The backlash' from the publication of an essay by Paul Scheffer (2000) entitled ‘The Multicultural drama', in which he took the Dutch elite to the sword regarding a failed immigration and integration policy. This specific essay subsequently became a document that was praised by this same elite. The addressed elite consists generally of certain academics, politicians and journalists. One could easily say that Pim Fortuyn 's elevation to political fame was partly enhanced due to the media hype around Scheffer's essay.
The murder of Theo van Gogh in 2003 could also be seen as an added factor in this same context. In the general election of 2006, Geert Wilders a virulent anti–migration and anti–Muslim agitator, with his then newly formed Party of Freedom (PVV), went from 1 to 9 seats in the Dutch Parliament. At the same time Rita Verdonk, a minister of the second Balkenende cabinet, who was responsible for the enforcing of the latest stringent immigration and integration policies and one who wallows in creating controversies, with policies aimed at attracting voters with right wing sentiments left the Liberal Party (VVD) in 2007 . Since then she has started her own political movement .
All of these above–mentioned developments have lead among other things to a political abnormality or a form of symbolic politics, which has become more evident in the Dutch political arena and sociology. Wilders and Verdonk, both former members of the Liberal Party, consistently entertain themselves and their followers with anti–migrants and anti–Muslims statements and threats, which are viewed favourably by the local media. They are subsequently seen by the media and a section of the Dutch public as two of the most prominent and outstanding political leaders in the Netherlands at the moment.
Actually, the radical and dramatic transformations, which have taken place within the policy framework, in the last years, are significantly related to the above – mentioned developments. The Dutch government policies which begun in the nineteen fifties geared at the recruitment of migrant workers is long dead and buried. Presently, the policies are focused on preventing the entrance of migrants to the Netherlands from non–Western countries, including Surinam and the enforcement of obligatory integration/assimilation and national identity politics and policies. Hence, t he current policy has gone, in the last years, through various stages, which have been heavily influenced on the one hand by the whims of politicians and the Dutch media and on the other hand public sentiments, nourished and sustained chiefly by the same media and most politicians. This has generally stimulated and reinforced the notions that some how ethnic minorities personified a certain threat to the well–being and safety of the native Dutch .
The migration history of certain groups to the Netherlands has been recorded and analysed on numerous occasions by Dutch scholars and others specialized or otherwise interested in migration and integration policies. Vasta (2006) one of these authors, analyses the history of the various policies adeptly from a stirring angle. Vasta argues that “there have been three main approaches that correspond with specific policies (although there is some overlap) – pillarization, ethnic minorities policy from 1983; and integration policy which was introduced in 1994, but has been revised and tightened up since” (2006:4). The concept of pillarization is a throw back to the 16 th and 17th centuries when cultural differences and religious ruptures in the Netherlands between Catholics, Protestants and others were pacified and members of the various pillars were held in check via the elites of the various interest or religious groups. The added valve in Vasta's thesis is the relationship that is exposed between the Dutch pillarization history and the consequences for present day thoughts, believes, attitudes, policies and practices regarding ethnic minorities.
The thesis of pillarization strongly resembles the assumptions of Ghorashi (2006) in terms of ‘categorical thinking' by the native Dutch. According to Ghorashi, categorical thinking encompasses two components: the placing of a disproportional emphasis on ‘culturalisering' aspects in regard to ethnic minorities and the thinking of them in terms of problem categories or having cultural deficiencies (2006:8). Consequently, the various memorandums and policies have gone through different changes; the focus is perhaps different but the categorical thinking has remained. In essence, categorical thinking could also be seen as tantamount to a constant differentiating being made between ‘ we ' (native Dutch) and ‘them' (the ethnic minorities.) This begs the question of whether this ‘we' is perhaps equivalent to the ‘us' of Putnam (2000)? Whatever the ‘we' or ‘us' is, it is noticeable and recorded, that ethnic minorities are systematically ridiculed and socially excluded for not integrating into the mainstream of Dutch society. The consequences are among others, that the are faced with additional constraints toward upward social mobility.
Paradoxically, in an era where globalisation and individualisation are generally accepted as the celebrated norms in Western societies, where much is said and written about the rights and duties of the individual, this seems not to apply to the members of the ethnic minority groups. They are systematically and knowingly classified and approached in terms of their so–called ethnic group membership. Not only is their social–economical integration questioned, but so too their social–cultural integration (Snel et al 2006). The WRR (2007) describes in her report the transformation in the Netherlands from an integration discussion to a national identity discussion. In this debate the businesslike and scientific language, which has dictated the integration debate for years has been replaced for the purpose of the national identity debate by a language engrossed in intense emotional sentiments (WRR, 2007:83). The WRR argues further that one could safely say that since 2000 national identity and to a lesser extent nationalism have become accepted subjects in the general public arena and the political debates.
In their study, Spiecker et al (2004) paraphrase Rawls (1993) to present the Netherlands as a liberal democratic state. They are of the opinion that before a migrant could be integrated into the Dutch democratic society he/she must at least acquire the liberal virtues as prescribed by Rawls. Spiecker et al also have their reservations about whether the migrant with his self–conception of particular ethno–cultural minority group could identify with the common Dutch culture. In accordance with their assumptions, members of the ethnic minority groups are not competent enough for membership in the well–functioning liberal democracy . One gets the impression that Speicker et al are actually referring to the Muslim migrants. In the case of the Surinamese, Antillean and Aruban educated blacks and those not educated it will be rather complicated to deny them ‘by law' the same rights which native Dutch citizens are entitled to. Spiecker et al are nevertheless charitable enough to afford the migrant and or his children membership, should they eventually become proficient in the virtues of the liberal state through specific education and training, the rights of citizenship. It is this sort of categorical thinking and assertions emanating from post-multicultural academics and politicians that brings to mind the thesis of Vasta wherein she stipulates that “it is not immigrants refusal to integrate that is the core issue, but rather processes of racialisation and institutional racism within the Dutch society – an idea largely ignored in dominant political and academic discourses” (2006:3).
The above–mentioned assertion of Vasta relates closely to the theory of Steinberg (2000) in his essay on ‘The cultural fallacy in studies of racial and ethnic mobility', wherein he states that “the thrust of social research and social policy was directed, not at improving conditions for blacks, but rather at reforming attitudes among whites. Liberation for blacks would have to wait for whites to undergo a therapeutic transformation” (Steinberg, 2000:63). While Scheffer (2007) argues forcefully, in his new book ‘Het Land van Aankomst ', (translated freely The Country They Came To) for a historical framework from which to understand, appreciate and reinforce the Dutch national identity, he admonishes the descendants of those previously enslaved and colonized for being to analytical, demanding and sentimental in relation to their dreadful historical encounters with the Dutch in the past and the present. In this same vein, the scope for educated blacks to pursue upward social mobility in the Netherlands is related to the constrained notions and sentiments of national identity.
Actually, the theses of both Vasta and Steinberg are compatible to Grosfoguel's (2006) ideas of the construction of national identity being entangled with racial categories. In a sense, the above–mentioned findings resemble ‘cultural racism'. “Cultural racism assumes that the metropolitan culture is different from the ethnic minorities culture but understood in an absolutist, essentialist sense, that is, ‘we are so different that we cannot get along together' or minorities belong to a different culture that does not understand the cultural norms of our country” (Grosfoguel, 2006:5). In terms of the conscious or unconscious employment of categorical thinking, racialisation and institutional or ‘cultural' racism, the culture of the other , seems to have become the ‘one fit all' hypothesis to explain and interpret the actions of blacks and ethnic minorities. The old thinking, in terms of the multicultural society, has been rejected; however, there has not been any agreement over the new manner of looking at the society. The difference is that national identity is used to define and (re)formulate from a historical perspective who the Dutch were and what they want to be (WRR, 2007).
It is in the above–discussed context of the social and ‘political' mind set related to the national identity that Surinamese, Antillean and Aruban educated blacks are supposed to perform using social capital in the service of their upward social mobility processes. This brings me back to an assertion by Coleman (1988:103) that individuals in social structures with high levels of obligations have more social capital on which they can draw. In Cain (2007), it was noted that the Surinamese ought to have had an added advantage, in comparison to the Antilleans and Arubans, in terms of their involvement with civic organisations. The Surinamese educated blacks, in that study, did not use their social capital in a more effective manner than the Antilleans and Arubans in the support of their upward social mobility processes. However, the Surinamese participation in civic organisations was much higher than that of the Antilleans and Arubans.
In the following section, the discussion is continued using among others a few empirical findings regarding educated blacks in the Netherlands .
The State of Affairs
One of the foremost ambitions of many parents of Surinamese, Antillean and Aruban educated is the encouragement of their offsprings to further their higher educational studies in the Netherlands . Even though there are universities in Surinam , the Antilles and Aruba , albeit with limited faculties, these do no not and never did command the status in comparison to attending a university in the mother country. The Dutch credentials are seen as extremely more important than local academic degrees. These parents are not inhibited by what Brown (2003) referred to as the opportunity trap of education. That is to say having more qualified persons than there are sufficient available jobs to provide the graduates with employment or opportunities to start an own business. However, an opportunity trap in post–industrial countries like the Netherlands , is not the same thing in countries like Surinam , the Dutch Antilles and Aruba . Selection for the furtherance of one's education was and still is largely dependent on one's attendance and performance in certain secondary schools. However, a person parent's social class position remains a determinant in who gets to go where, before and after attending university.
The selection process leading to a study in the Netherlands is connected to the social network of the parents. The student is expected to posses a reasonable amount of talent and drive to succeed. However, the connections of the parents related to their social class will play a role. In the literature, pertaining to social capital much is written referring to how social relationships are built and maintained. From common sense knowledge, it is also evident that friendship, which started in secondary school or even earlier and continued on to college, university and the labour market, could be quite essential in determining the value of agent's social capital. This means that an agent is involved in a particular social network or a number of social networks. Granovetter (1973) argues that weak ties are often more effective in the finding of employment than strong ties. The assumption is that the ties that an agent has with family members and close friends should be labelled as strong ties, whereas the ties that one has with acquaintances and other casual relationships are taken as weak ties. The question here is whether educated blacks in the Netherlands could be an exception to this ‘rule'. In the sense that their strong ties and weak ties amount to identical ties.
It also begs the question of the nature of the social capital, in the sense of structure of relationships, of educated blacks in the Netherlands . I argue that because cultural capital influences an agent's social capital this then in effect partially determines the agent's class position in the social stratification of society. Hoetink (1975) maintains that the dominance of one socio–racial or socio–cultural group in a society ultimately rests on the economic power of that group. That is not to say that economic stratification could be less important than the ascriptive norms. This seems to be the case in Surinam , the Dutch Antilles, Aruba and the Netherlands , where the dominant socio–racial group determines who sits where and who gets what. Hence, the division of labour and the distribution of social and capital goods are closely related to the ‘power', which the dominant socio–racial group employs to further its group's interest. A social construction of this sort leads inevitably to the practice of racial discrimination and social exclusion of members of other socio–racial groups.
However, even though there are still racist factors in the social interaction between members of the various ethnic groups, in the above – mentioned societies a person's or family's social class does make a difference. One ought to bear in mind that in both Surinam , the Dutch Antilles and Aruba ascriptive norms of selection for certain employment positions and consequently social mobility has to do with socio–racial determinants, which sometimes predominate over economic stratification. In the social stratification within all of these societies ‘whiteness' seems to be a significant norm to attain certain economic positions. When a coloured or black person is allowed into an economic meaningful position his/her immediate family is bequeathed with ‘could be white' social status. It is within this context where the white socio–racial group has consolidated the economic power and the power to determine the entrance to institutions and organisations that certain status positions are here and there allotted to coloured and black persons. This affords many of these educated blacks to reside in some cases in the ‘better' neighbourhoods where it is possible to mingle in a limited manner with others of the ‘same' social standings but from the dominant socio–racial group.
Concurrently, having a political position or a high profile job and exploiting one's political connections and links as such is also an important factor in terms of social stratification in these societies. In the Netherlands , it also means that an agent is socially and culturally integrated. He/she knows ‘enough' about the Dutch society and cultural habits and has command of the Dutch language. The agent has shown that he/she is qualified to think and act white. The attainment of a university degree also goes a long way in helping this agent, or giving the agent the belief that he/she has some how bridged the gap between his/her socio–racial group and ‘whiteness'. That is to say, that whiteness seems to be fast becoming the norm of the new immigration and integration policies of the Netherlands , especially when one speaks in terms of national identity policies. I will continue by using a few illustrations from my own fieldwork.
Social capital as a structure of relationships
In the preparation of Cain (2007), I did research with a group of Surinamese, Antillean and Aruban educated blacks, who grew up in Surinam , the Dutch Antilles, and Aruba and to a lesser extent the Netherlands . From a group of 55 cases made of ethnic minority managers and some native Dutch managers with which I worked in that study, Surinamese, Antilleans and Arubans educated blacks were 23 of these cases. This group was more or less evenly divided between males and females. A few of the Surinamese migrated to the Netherlands with their parents in the late seventies. Three of the Antilleans were of mixed parentage and born in the Netherlands . It became clear during the study that the majority of the parents of these respondents were/are members of the middle class of even elite in their respective countries of Surinam , the Dutch Antilles and Aruba . The parents' social networks were possibly effective for themselves and children in those countries, but it was doubtful whether these were or could be effective for their off springs in the Netherlands. This is generally the case with the majority of educated blacks in the Netherlands. In terms of their parents been overseas, their social capital is limited to their respective country of residence. In the case of the parents being a resident in the Netherlands, the difference lies in the fact that the majority of first generation black parents did not make it into the Dutch middle class strata, when an agent was growing up.
The building and social networks been related as it is to one's social class position and access to others in other social networks respondents were asked to describe the persons with whom they were befriended during the period when they attended secondary school. These friends turned out not to be very different from the friends and playmates they had, when they were growing up. The friends were generally persons of the same ethnic group as themselves. Except for the fact that the majority of the them attended secondary school in Surinam, the Dutch Antilles and Aruba the difference in this period was that only the best educational endowed students and persons belonging to the ‘white' dominant socio–racial group were their classmates. This was also as far as their social interactions with white people went. The ethnic and racial divide was an obstacle to the building of sustainable social networks. This was the case in the Caribbean but also the case in the Netherlands. As mentioned by Brown (2003), education was/is a selective mechanism and was/is attached to ‘parentocracy' . The role of parents in the assisting of their offspring to create human capital remains an essential element in the social mobility processes.
Given that being a member of a student association is widely taken in the Netherlands as a stepping–stone for the development of life long friendships, the building of a social network and a manner to indirectly further one's career chances there is always a noted interest in terms of the membership in a Dutch student association. It is common knowledge that black students do not easily become members of the white student foundations. In Cain (2007), it emerged, that only a few of the respondents were members of Dutch student associations. When they were members of a student foundation, it was an association, which catered chiefly to a particular racial group and ethnic culture. It is plausible that these ethnic organisations constituted social capital à la Coleman's (1988) classification of organisations as a form of social capital. In the context of participating in their own associations, these respondents were intermingling with others of their own ethnic group and were quite comfortable doing that. Friendships were established with someone from another ethnic minority group or from one's own ethnic group. However, social distance was maintained between educated blacks and members of the white dominant group. As it transpires, many of these respondents continued to rely on strong ties, in most cases instead of weak ties. In this sense, it appears that applying Granovveter's (1973) thesis of strong ties and weak ties will not be consistent with their experiences.
Further examination regarding social capital as a structure of relationships was looked at by asking respondents about their relationships during their period at university. What emerged was that role played by race, ethnicity and skin colour in the forming of social networks. For an illustration of the manner in which relationships were articulated by race, ethnicity and skin colour I turn to two examples. One Surinamese male respondent explained his position as such:
“Maybe both ethnicity and skin colour played a role, but I am not sure. I was not focused on this point. I am a direct person and hence quite clear in my way of dealing with discrimination and things of that sort. I also did two years of my fourth and fifth year of secondary education in the Netherlands. When I first came to the Netherlands, I was 19 years. In that period, I had many friends, especially Dutch girl friends. I can't remember been ever discriminated against”. |
In the citation above the respondent made two major declarations; to start with he was unsure as to whether his daily experiences had anything to do with his ethnicity and skin colour and he cannot remember even been discriminated. From my vantage point as a researcher, it can be stated that he was black, in terms of his phenotypic appearance and would surely have experienced some form of discrimination, whether directly or indirectly. Being discriminated was not a fact of life that a black person in a society riddled with ‘cultural racism' was going to miss. His experience in regard to discrimination is personal and subjective. Hence, it is cumbersome to put a moral value on what he experienced or give an interpretation to his declared feelings and observation. The following is a citation from an Antillean female respondent:
“In many instances ethnicity and skin colour did play a role. No doubt about that. Sometimes, I was really pissed and saddened, because I felt that I was being singled out. However, I was able to retain my cool and did not get into much confrontations or problems. The best thing for me was to pretend that everything was okay and get on with my work.” |
According to this respondent, she was able to deal with the racism monster and discrimination by creating distance between what was said and done and the perseverance of herself and her mission in the Netherlands. She had come to study and wanted to attain her degree as quickly as possible. This black woman took a functional approach to the matter of social relationships with native Dutch persons she had to deal with. Her explicit example is in some ways an explanation for the fact that the building or being part of the social networks with native Dutch persons was related to ethnicity and skin colour. She was not a member of their social network and neither were they of hers. In the words of the WRR (2007), there was no ‘functional identification'.
The present social relationships of the respondents did not necessarily had to be friendships or connections, which started many years ago. Nevertheless, it was important to register what the make up, structure and size of their present social network relationships were. This was one of the methods used to look at the value their social networks in terms of job seeking, making promotion or getting involved with other social networks. The question was with whom respondents normally mingle on a frequent basis. In their reaction, they provided a range of answers. These were immediate and extended family, friends of the same, various or another ethnic group, colleagues and neighbours. All respondents named the immediate family as the entity with which they most mingle. The second entity with which they had very good contact was the extended family. However, in most cases the extended families of these respondents were not in the Netherlands. Spending time with the immediate family could be interpreted as obvious, because one sees the immediate family most likely on a daily basis. Taken on a general basis one could say that the experiences of these respondents are not really different form those of the vast amount of educated blacks in the Netherlands.
Ethnicity as social capital
If by chance or as a given fact one is not a member of a particular dominant ethnic group, which could constitute connection to effective social capital, one might be faced with more constraints than possibilities in his/her of upward social mobility processes. Certain forms of social capital reside within the family, from which the individual could make use of. At the same time, the individual is expected to be capable of developing his/her own social capital, which does not necessarily frustrate the commanding of certain links within the social networks of the family. Seeing ethnicity as social capital opens the doors to various interpretations. On the one hand, this means that an agent's social relationships are situated within the structure of the social networks, which are actually ethnic related relationships. Another interpretation is that ethnicity as a form of social capital could work positively if the societal context and social–political setting is conducive to the accommodation of members of ethnic minority groups to excel and make full use of their knowledge, talents and social skills. In both cases an agent strong and weak ties are inter – related. However, in a context where “cultural racism” is rearing, constantly in a subtle fashion, its ugly head and social laws and codes are employed to perpetuate social inequalities, using ethnicity as social capital becomes problematic.
Zhou's (2005) thesis of ethnicity as social capital portrays the manner in which ethnicity was used as an asset. This is given further credence by her account of the social interactions and relationships within the ‘ethnic enclave'. Zhou is quoted in Dwyer et al (2006) as referring to the ‘ethnic enclave' as a social construct of group orientation, organisational structure and ethnic involvement […] with various ethnic institutions which bind families and individuals to an interlocking network of ethnic relations all combine to produce a form of ethnic social capital (2006:7). This is taken as evidence for the social mobility that families are experiencing within one generation in Chinatown, New York. The extension here is that, if this was possible in Chinatown, it could also be possible in other ethnic enclaves in other post –industrial countries. One wonders whether this will work for other ethnic minorities outside of an ‘ethnic enclave'. Notwithstanding, Zhou also argued that ethnicity could accelerate or slow down the upward social mobility of some ethnic groups. She further argues that ethnicity could keep some from advancing or possibly even pushing them towards the bottom.
Earlier, in this paper, I cited Portes (1998) reference to the negative consequences of social capital when social interaction takes place chiefly within the context of one's own ethnic group. Portes stresses that the role of social networks as being equally important in studies of ethnic business enclaves and ethnic niches. One could ask whether ethnicity as social capital does not amount to more or less ethnic relationships within structures, which are closely related to the participation of ethnic minorities in business, especially in an enclave setting. Dwelling further on the issue of ethnicity as social capital Dwyer et al changed their uncertainty regarding ethnicity as social capital when they wrote: “From our perspective, Putnam, like Coleman, provides a framework for thinking about ethnicity as social capital. We could hypothesise that an ethnic group might have shared networks, norms and trust which might enable participants to act to pursue shared objectives for example in the pursuit of social mobility” (2006:5). This last citation supports the notion that members of ethnic minorities do not necessarily have to be members of the ethnic enclave to enhance the opportunities of the various social networks within this enclave during their upward social mobility processes. A further interpretation could be that members of an ethnic minority group do not necessary have to share similar goals and interests, even when they have the same cultural background to attain their objectives.
One aspect of building social networks, which seems constantly to influence the integration of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands, is their proficiency of the Dutch language. In other words, their ability to communicate on various levels with native Dutch people and with members of other ethnic minority groups in the Dutch language. I argue that where the command of the Dutch language might be an impediment for some members of the ethnic minority groups in the Netherlands that is far from the case for Surinamese Antillean and Aruban educated blacks. As earlier mentioned, they by virtue of their colonial connections with the Netherlands, the school curriculum and practises in their parents' countries of birth and their own educational qualifications do posses the language and social skills to communicate on the various levels with native Dutch people. Speaking, the local language of Surinam, Sranan, or the Papiamento of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba, especially within the confirms of the ethnic minority group does not constitute a weakness in an agent's abilities and ambition to upward social mobility; neither does this indicate that the use of one's own language within the group leads to a poor command of communication with others in the Netherlands.
L i (2006) stipulates that people with strong social networks are likely to have better social skills, which are more important than technical skills, especially in jobs where ‘people skills' are highly recommended. The possession of ‘people skills', as we know, is not limited to one or any specific ethnic group. However, using people skills to bridge the gap or communicate across ethnic boundaries could be very important in certain settings. In relation to Li's thesis, the respondents in Cain's (2007) study were asked to explain the usage of their social skills in their communication processes and friendship with native Dutch colleagues and others of the different ethnic groups in their place of employment. It transpires that communication with native Dutch and others was not an impediment. The educated blacks declared to have had good relationships with persons from various races and ethnic cultures. However, these relationships with native Dutch persons were often at most businesslike. Friendship between these respondents and native Dutch was limited. Everyone on both sides of the divide kept their social distance. In the case of partner and marriage choices, this was another matter, which goes beyond the scope of this paper (cf. SCP, 2007 for details pertaining to inter–ethnic partner relationships).
The viewing of the educated blacks in the Netherlands as constituting a single ethnic group is not correct. This is theoretically and also empirically a very hard nut to crack. These educated blacks do not belong to a specific ethnic group. They do have a great amount of phenotypic characteristics, historical experiences, cultural artefact and habits and other resemblances in common. However, the geography and size of their respective parents' countries are different, these specifics also determine to a certain extent the life – chances and life style and social networks of the educated blacks. This assumption also applies to the educated blacks born and culturalized in the Netherlands. Ethnicity as social capital in the present social and political setting in the Netherlands, where the government immigration and integration policies play a major role in the articulation of who is Dutch, remains a doubtful point of departure. One has to bear in mind that even though educated blacks, as referred to in this paper, are legally Dutch citizens by virtue of their juridical status based on an historical and a shared colonial past their social capital, social network and social mobility are to a great extent influenced by the tone and effects of the government integration policies. They are seen and approached as ‘outsiders'. Being an outsider creates more constraints, which have to be translated into possibilities.
Conclusions
This paper started by enquiring whether social capital could plays a role in the social mobility processes of Surinamese, Antillean and Aruban educated blacks in the Netherlands. In the defining of social capital, the thesis of Bourdieu (1984) and Coleman (1988) as paraphrased by Portes (1998) were used and acknowledged wherein social capital is seen as inherent in the structure of social relationships. “ To possess social capital, a person must be related to others, and it is those others, not himself, who are the actual source of his or her advantage” (Portes, 1988). Coleman (1988) and Dwyer el al (2006) also argue that ethnicity is a form of social capital. Zhou (2005) says the same in regards to her study in China Town, New York among the Chinese ethnic group operating in an ethnic enclave. In the laying out of the points of departure for this paper, I mentioned that it was not my intention to use social capital theory to explain the upward social mobility processes of educated blacks. The objective was to seize the conception of social capital, whether as structures of relationships or in the form of ethnicity as social capital as a factor, which educated blacks use or could use to improve their upward social mobility processes.
The Dutch government immigration and integration policies were analysed from a historical perspective and could be qualified as being more of an hindrance than an asset to the ethnic minorities and especially so in the case of Surinamese, Antillean and Aruban educated blacks to upward social mobility. Unlike many members of the other ethnic minority groups in the Netherlands, one might be opt to think that the negative effects of the government integration policies do not affect educated blacks, in a negative manner, due to their colonial connections and socialisation with the Dutch culture. This is not the case. Persons with a Surinamese, Antillean and Aruban background whether educated or not are grosso modo articulated and categorized as ‘outsiders'. The mere fact that ethnic minorities are constantly articulated and classified according to their or their parents' ethnic background has not been useful. The ‘culturalisering' approach of members of ethnic minority groups has had profound influence on the social and political environment in the country. (Cf. Ghorashi, 2001; WRR, 2007). In this context the ‘backlash' against the multicultural society, which has manifested after ‘9–11 and the emergence of Pim Fortuyn have also played a role in the determining the conditions wherein educated blacks has to strive for upward social mobility.
The usage of social capital as a theoretical point of departure to study the upward social mobility processes of blacks or Africans in the Diaspora, whether on an individual or on a group basis was explained as not being popular in academia. I argue that even the inadequate amount of these studies, which could be found, does display a certain preconceived notion in regards to the social class position of Africans in the Diaspora. In this paper, the emphasis was placed on the use of social capital by educated blacks. To illustrate the relevance of this approach the study of empirical examples were taken from the study of Cain (2007) in the framework of social capital as a structure of relationships, it emerged that the social networks of the respondents were predominantly made up of friends and relatives from more or less the same ethnic cultural group. The respondents mingled and had friendship with persons from different socio–racial groups when they were teenagers; this was also true when they were in secondary school. In that period of time the majority were still living in Surinam, the Dutch Antilles and Aruba. Their arrival in the Netherlands to study did not really change this social reality. Dutch society, offered less clear–cut opportunities to intermingle and make friends with native Dutch students, lectures and others. The social relationships, which were prevalent, were of a businesslike nature. Members of the various socio–racial groups kept more or less their social distance. When they entered the labour market and were even promoted to the higher echelons within the organisation, the social relationships remained in most cases predominantly ethnic related. This is generally the case with the majority of educated blacks in the Netherlands.
In the case of ethnicity as social capital, it was evident that in the specific setting of the Netherlands this could not be underwritten. The social networks of educated blacks are not pregnant with power brokers and decision makers, who had knowledge, which could lead to receiving information either through weak or strong ties. In the case of the respondents in Cain's study, it was clear that the middle class and elite positions of their parents in Surinam, the Dutch Antilles and Aruba were almost inconsequential to social network formation in the Netherlands. The assumption that ethnicity as a form of social capital, which, when organised along the lines as Coleman (1988) or even Zhou (2005), who did research in Chinatown, New York, could produce relationships with ‘power' to facilitate upward social mobility does not carry credence in the Netherlands. This finding brings to mind Plaza's (1998) arguments that Caribbean born men were naïve in thinking that, the accumulation of diplomas and degrees would have paved their way to upward social mobility in Canada. They did not make any genuine calculations in regard to racism and discrimination in the allocation of positions when it came to social stratification processes. Their amassing of educational credentials was not enough. An issue for further discussion and research is whether Surinamese, Antillean and Aruban educated blacks have the aptitude and the attitude to make ethnicity as social capital work on their behalf in the Netherlands.
Social capital as a structure of relationships could continue to work negatively for educated blacks as this transpired in the case of Cain's study of Surinamese, Antillean and Aruban educated blacks. Their social networks as related to persons in the ‘main stream; institutions and organisations had/have limited value. This is related, I assume to the fact that there are a few or no native Dutch persons in their social networks and the structural social exclusion they constantly face. Educated blacks operating in the framework of their social networks do have certain important functions, and roles to play, however they were/are not in a position to offer information to others or apply influence in helping others to attain high–powered positions. Social capital as a structure of relationship is handy but not for them attaining ‘top' positions in the Netherlands. In the case of ethnicity as social capital it became evident that whereas the thesis of Zhou (2005) worked in the analysing and description of the social mobility processes in the Chinese ethnic enclave it is another matter, when applied to Surinamese, Antillean and Aruban educated blacks who are not members of a specific ethnic group and definitely not from an ethnic enclave.
Educated blacks in the Netherlands seemed to have arrived at their positions by virtue of their attained education, efforts, parents cultural capital, class position, their social capital, social skills and their willingness to make sacrifices in the face of ‘cultural racism', lopsided integration policies and limited opportunities. Their social capital was and remains a factor but is not the most important factor. For the time being the social capital of Surinamese, Antillean and Aruban educated blacks or people of the African Diaspora have proven to be inadequate to propel them into positions of ‘power'. This sort of social capital is not enough. Blacks or persons of the African Diaspora are not members of the ‘ we' or the ‘us in the Netherlands' . They will attain in the coming years sufficient human capital but human capital without the ‘right sort' of social capital could mean the continuation of social and ethnic inequalities.
Notes
For more details of the various studies pertaining to immigrants and minorities in relation to public policy, cf. Essed & Nimako (2006).
Blacks in this context are more than a physical Negroid phenotype, in the sense of race and ethnic culture. It is also a political and ideological classification having to do with social identification and the manner in which many person of the African Diaspora see and describe themselves. Educated hinges on the fact that these agents have gone to university in the Netherlands and obtained either a Bachelors and or a Masters degree.
Portes (1998) referred in his study to at least four negatives consequences of social capital: ‘exclusion of outsiders, excess claim on group members, restriction on individual freedom, and downward levelling norms'.
Colemans's (1988) thesis is that parents can only transform human capital to their children, when the social capital relationship between these parents and their children is very good and experienced by the children as such.
The three best known and quoted in the field of social capital theory are Bourdieu, Coleman and Putnam.
Silva & Edwards (2004) claim that in Bourdieu's work cultural capital is only one possible source of social advantage, which is compounded by social and economic capitals. Whereas in their project, cultural capital is defined with reference to the roles that distinctive kinds of cultural tastes, knowledge and abilities play in relation to the processes of class formation in contemporary societies (Silva & Edwards, 2004:5).
7. The WRR, the Scientific Council for Government Policies, is a highly respected body appointed by the government and peopled by professor and other scholars.
The Council advices the national government on a requested and a non–requested basis. It advice is mostly taken very seriously, by the media, politicians and other scientists. However, these stakeholders did not receive the report of 2007 kindly. It did not underscore the discourse of migrant bashing.
Theo van Gogh was a native Dutchman, cineaste and columnist who was renowned in provoking others including Muslims and especially Moroccans. A fanatic Moroccan Muslim murdered him in Amsterdam in 2003.
The draconian immigration laws of 2000, which Verdonk as a minister defended and administrated with much ado were developed by Job Cohen, of the Labour party (PvdA), during his period in the cabinet as a junior minister responsible for among other things the immigration policies.
The name of the movement is ‘Trots op Nederland', literally translated: Proud of the Netherlands. At the moment of writing Verdonk is said to have moved from commanding 25 parliamentary seats to 11, in the electoral cyber opinion polls. Her popularity seems to be in the decreasing.
Native Dutch is used here to signify persons, who are observed as belonging to phenotype, normally called white, born and bread in the Netherlands with white parents or outside of the Netherlands with white Dutch parents and are not classified by the state, in the Dutch scientific literature and public opinion as the ‘other' , the outsider or a person from an ethnic minority group.
Freedom of speech which gives the right to say what one wants, when one feels, especially and negatively in reference to migration, ethnic minorities and Muslims is fast becoming in the Netherlands the most celebrated of these liberal virtues in the last years.
Brown states that parentocracy rather than meritocracy is becoming the norm in the UK and the US. Parentocracy has to do with the congested competition created by the opportunity trap of education where parents within the middle classes heavy compete among themselves for the best schools, colleges, universities and jobs for their children (Brown, 2003).
Cf., note 2.
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